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2Abstract
The study aims at examining the past and possible future role of Indonesia in 
the development of cooperation within the framework of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). After the description of the main steps and 
achievements of building a regional community both in the field of politics and 
economy, the author seeks to identify the reasons of difficulties to deepen 
economic integration, with special regard to the interests and policy of Indonesia. 
She concludes that by now Indonesia has not ceased to be interested in the 
security political cooperation within ASEAN and continues to be counter 
interested in deeper economic integration because of competitiveness reasons. 
The new leadership of the country since 2014 has taken a broader than ASEAN 
regional view in its foreign policy spectrum and for this Indonesia may pay less 
attention to the cooperation within ASEAN what may hinder the development of 
the South-East Asian organization.
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IntRoDUCtIon
Since the 2008 global crisis, the world economic and political 
order has got into a rather chaotic transition period. The old super-
structure has proved to be unable to solve the multidimensional 
crises that emerged with the burst of the financial bubble in 2008 
and the outlines of a new structure have been as yet out of sight. 
Although after the 2008 crisis the neoliberal way of economic man-
agement, that was unchallengeable for decades, has been widely 
criticised, it could preserve its hegemony due to lack of any alterna-
tive in the economic thinking. The least one can say is that the Eu-
ropean Union, flagship of regionalisation, social rights and welfare 
for decades, has reached a stalemate with the unsolved Greek crisis 
and Brexit round the corner. But even irrespective of the difficulties 
of integration, there is a turmoil in Europe. It is enough to think of 
the tensions with Russia, the situation in Ukraine, the intensifica-
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tion of migration, the terrorist attacks like the one in Nice or the coup 
attempt in Turkey. All these, of course, are in close relations with 
the North African Spring and its consequences, especially with the 
emergence of Islamic State among them, which themselves are in 
strong relations with the geopolitical changes that have recently 
taken place. Furthermore, the development problems of Africa, 
inherited from its colonial past, always result in newer and deeper 
conflicts, famine and bloodsheds, most recently in South Sudan. 
Looking at the other part of the world, the Latin American integra-
tion, UNASUR is forced to be preoccupied with the management of 
crisis in Venezuela instead of focusing on its own development. 
All in all, the current global political and economic reality is not 
favourable to the regional cooperation in the same way as a decade 
ago. It is reflected in the problems of regional integrations in gener-
al, but also in the developments of other regional initiatives includ-
ing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
This paper aims at presenting these changes after a short intro-
duction of the economy of ASEAN and the main steps of develop-
ment of regional cooperation with special regard to the difficulties 
of economic collaboration. The next chapter presents first the place 
of Indonesia within ASEAN, then, after a brief historical overview, 
describes the Indonesian approach of economic and political inte-
gration. The last section before the conclusions deals with the new-
est developments in the Indonesian foreign policy that may have a 
negative effect on the future development of regional integration.
EConoMy oF AsEAn In gLobAL ContEXt
ASEAN consists of 10 countries: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Vietnam. Their total land area is 4.4 million km2, about the same 
4size as the EU-28 and in 2015 the total population of the ten coun-
tries reached 632 million, 8.6 percent of the world’s population. In 
2015 their aggregated GDP amounted to 2,453 billion USD at 
current prices being equal to 3.3 percent of the world’s GDP.1
For further comparison, Figure 1 gives the ratios of certain in-
dicators of ASEAN in relation to those of the 28-member European 
Union. The figure shows that except for the size of the population, 
ASEAN represents only a fraction of the economic potential of the 
EU. The level of intra-ASEAN trade (24.3% for exports and imports 
together) is only 40 percent of the intra-EU-28 trade (60.1%), a 
figure which clearly reflects the big difference between the depths 
of economic integration of the two organizations.
Figure 1. Statistical indicators of ASEAN in percentage, compared with 
those of the EU28 in 2014 and 2015 (USD at current prices and current 
exchange rates)
Source: Own calculations based on UNCTADstat, Data center.
1  UNCTADstat, Data center, Economictrends, National accounts.
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ASEAN comprises very diverse states including large and small, 
developed (for example Singapore) and developing countries as 
well. The differences between the GDP/capita of the poorest and the 
richest members, the largest and smallest numbers of populations 
or the size of territories are larger than those in the European Union 
(Table 1 and Figure 2).
Table 1. Basic indicators of ASEAN, 2015
Country
Total
land area
Total 
population
Population 
density
Annual 
population 
growth
Gross 
domestic 
product 
at current 
prices
Gross 
domestic 
product 
per capita 
at current 
prices
International
merchandise trade Foreign
direct
investments
infowExports Imports
Total 
trade
km2 thousand
persons 
per km2
percent
US$
million
US$ 
US$ 
PPP 
US$ 
million
US$ 
million
US$ 
million
US$ 
million
US$ 
million
2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2014 2015
Brunei 
Darussalam 5,769 417.2 72 1.3 12,909 30,942 87,117 6,350 3,042 9,392 568 171
Cambodia 181,035 15,405.2 85 1.5 18,463 1,198 3,578 8,839 10,838 19,676 1,727 1,701
Indonesia 1,913,579 255,461.7 133 1.3 857,603 3,357 11,108 150,282 142,695 292,977 21,810 16,073
Lao PDR 236,800 6,902.4 29 1.4 12,639 1,831 5,466 3,714 3,049 6,763 913 1,079
Malaysia 330,290 30,485.3 92 0.7 294,390 9,657 26,515 199,869 175,961 375,830 10,875 11,290
Myanmar 676,577 52,476.0 78 1.9 65,392 1,246 5,275 11,432 16,844 28,275 946 2,824
Philippines 300,000 101,562.3 339 1.7 289,503 2,850 7,241 58,648 70,295 128,944 5,815 5,724
Singapore 719 5,535.0 7,697 1.2 291,938 52,744 85,021 366,344 296,765 663,109 74,420 61,285
Thailand 513,120 68,979.0 134 0.5 395,726 5,737 16,064 214,396 202,751 417,147 3,720 8,027
Viet Nam 330,951 91,713.3 277 1.1 193,407 2,109 6,083 162,014 165,730 327,744 9,200 11,800
ASEAN 4,488,839 628,937.3 140 1.3 2,431,969 3,867 11,009 1,181,889 1,087,970 2,269,859 129,995 119,975
Source:  ASEAN Statistics, Selected Key Indicators, Table 1. http://asean.org/?static_
post=selected-key-indicators-2
6Figure 2. Distribution of GDP of ASEAN in 2015, millions of USD at constant 
prices and exchange rates (2005) 
Source: UNCTADStat Data center, Economic trends, National accounts.
The annual average economic growth of ASEAN countries on 
aggregate level was especially high, above seven per cent in the 
1970s. The growth rate fell under five percent in the next decade, 
which was still high in international comparison. Since the 1990s 
ASEAN as a whole has been growing by over five percent a year on 
year average that is slower than the rate of BRICS2 but considerably 
faster than that of the most advanced countries, the US, the EU15 
or Japan, as Figure 3 clearly indicates this. Although in the very end 
of 2015 the ASEAN declared that it established a single market (the 
ASEAN Economic Community), i.e. the free movement of goods, 
services, capitals and labour, the economic integration is far from 
being developed. The reason for this is the diverging interests of the 
member states, mainly the counter interests of Indonesia in deeper 
economic integration –we will discuss it later.
2  Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa. 
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Figure 3. GDP annual average growth rate, 1970-2015, in percentage
Source: UNCTADStat Data center, Economic trends, National accounts.
In the last ten years ASEAN members have been increasingly 
integrated into the global economy, but the Southeast Asian finan-
cial crisis broke this development. The average GDP/capita of ASE-
AN fell by 8.6 percent in 1998 and the exports lost its dynamism. 
While until the crisis the exports to GDP ratio had increased in 
most ASEAN-countries, this trend ceased to continue or started to 
decrease in the majority of the member states after 1998. On ag-
gregate level the exports to GDP ratio of ASEAN rose from 49 to 80 
percent between 1992 and 1998. In the following decade, it fluctu-
ated between 75 and 83 percent. Due to the 2008 global economic 
crisis, the ratio fell to 64.5 percent in 2009 and could not rise from 
this level in the following years either.
On the other hand, the intra-regional integration of ASEAN has 
not become much deeper in the last decades. The external trade 
of most of the member states has been oriented more significantly 
towards third countries than ASEAN. Between 1995 and 2007 the 
intra-regional trade of ASEAN has somewhat strengthened, mainly 
on the import side (the share of intra-regional imports in the total 
8imports rose from 18 to 25.8 percent), but the most dynamic export 
and import markets were the non-ASEAN countries of South and 
East Asia, first of all China. Between 2007 and 2014 the weight of 
intra-regional imports to total imports declined again. (The most im-
portant trade partners of ASEAN are China, US, Japan, and South 
Korea.)
tHE EVoLUtIon oF REgIonAL IntEgRAtIon
The ASEAN was founded on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok by the 
ASEAN Declaration (also known as the Bangkok Declaration). The 
five founding members were Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Sin-
gapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined in 1984, followed 
by Vietnam in 1995 and Lao Republic and Myanmar (Burma) in 
1997. Cambodia became the tenth member in 1999. With the wid-
ening of the community, its main goals have been somewhat altered 
and extended as well. 
Foundation by political reasons
At the time of its foundation, during the Second Indochina War, 
in a period when the communist ideology has been increasingly 
popular in the world and so in East Asia, the main ASEAN’s main 
objective was to avoid the “domino effect”, according to which com-
munism would expand in Southeast Asia if not contained (Keling 
et al., 2011, p. 179). Besides, there were several conflicts between the 
countries of the region (e.g. between Malaysia and Indonesia, Ma-
laysia and the Philippines) that had to be reconciled. For all these 
reasons the foundation of ASEAN and its first decade was clearly 
characterised by political considerations (Shimizu, 2004). This 
was summarized by the slogan ‘to ensure the political stability and 
peace’ in the 1967 ASEAN Declaration. 
ROLE OF INDONESIA IN THE EVOLUTION OF ASEAN  9
The ASEAN Declaration is a very short document, no longer 
than 2 pages and contains five articles only. Although the coop-
eration of Southeast Asian nations was urged by their fear of the 
spread of communism, they have already expressed their will in the 
founding document to cooperate with each other on a broad basis. 
Besides the promotion of peace and stability the five founders ex-
press their intention to accelerate socio-economic and cultural prog-
ress, facilitate collaboration in the economic, social, cultural, scien-
tific, technical and administrative fields, provide assistance for each 
other concerning education and training, improve and use more 
effectively member states’ resources in all fields of socio-economic 
activity, raise the living standard of people and promote Southeast 
Asian studies while maintaining cooperation with international and 
regional organizations having similar objectives.
Efforts to develop economic cooperation
The economic collaboration was addressed already in the first 
years of ASEAN when the United Nation prepared a study (‘Eco-
nomic Cooperation among Member Countries of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations’ – the so called Kansu-Robinson Report 
named after the leaders of the working group), which was discussed 
by the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1972 and laid the foundation 
for a series of collaboration initiatives. According to the spirit of the 
period, the Kansu-Robinson Report represented a view which could 
be described as “protectionist developmentalism”. It suggested “col-
lective import-substitution” concentrating in the heavy and chem-
ical industries and restrictions on foreign direct investments. The 
leaders of the then five member states accepted this approach and 
formulated the regional cooperation on this basis. The ministers 
of economic affairs first met in 1975 in Jakarta (Senior Economic 
Officials Meeting – SEOM), which was followed by the first ASEAN 
Summit in February 1976 in Bali. Here a more efficient organisa-
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tional structure was established, five committees of different levels 
were created (Head of Ministers, Foreign Ministers, Economic Min-
isters, Other Ministers and the Secretariat), the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation was signed and the ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIPs) 
were decided as well. In the following year, cautious trade liberal-
ization was launched within the framework of the ASEAN Preferen-
tial Trade Arrangement (PTA).3
Under the aegis of AIPs, joint companies would have been cre-
ated in order to produce certain products for the whole ASEAN 
market. The idea would have better fit planned economies – like the 
COMECON4 countries of Eastern Europe – as it turned out to be a 
failure in the case of market economies of ASEAN members espe-
cially during the ‘crisis years’ of the 1970s. The next experiment to 
promote industrial cooperation and economic development was the 
establishment of ASEAN Industrial Complementation Scheme (AIC) 
in 1981. AIC was planned specifically for the manufacturing of au-
tomobiles. In the same year, to help industrial cooperative projects 
like AICs, the ASEAN Finance Corporation (AFC) was founded as 
a co-operative venture of the commercial banks, but the first years 
of its activity were not very successful. The concept of the AIC was 
that the different parts of cars would have been produced in differ-
ent ASEAN countries, so the member states together would have 
produced an ‘ASEAN Car’. However, neither this method of cooper-
ation proved to be successful, because every member state wanted 
to build their own automobile industries (mainly in cooperation 
with Japanese manufacturers). To circumvent this problem and still 
encourage production cooperation in 1988, the leaders of ASEAN 
have given up the idea of a “community car” and replaced AICs 
3  On the development of industrial cooperation and trade liberalization in the first 
decades of ASEAN see Soesastro (2002).
4  Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. It was created by six Eastern-European 
countries in 1949. Five other socialist countries joined COMECON later on. The 
organization was dissolved in 1991.
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with the so-called Brand-to-Brand Complementation (BBC) Scheme, 
which guaranteed the use of corporate brands for the manufactur-
ers of automobile parts (Shimizu 1999).
The ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJVs) project, launched 
in 1983, was more flexible than the AIP or AIC but still could not 
reach its goals, because ASEAN companies have preferred to form joint 
ventures with foreign companies of developed countries (mainly 
Japan) instead of their ASEAN counterparts. 
The above-described initiatives were sufficient to express a 
wish for a closer collaboration among the member states but were 
insufficient to deepen their economic integration and stimulate 
their economic growth. By the 1980s, the import substitution strat-
egies have been exhausted and became outdated everywhere in the 
world. The 1980s brought the introduction and spread of neoliberal 
policies with the leadership of the IMF and the World Bank, power-
ful financial institutions that have assisted the indebted developing 
countries on the basis of ideas of the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Wil-
liamson, 1990). The economic policy of ASEAN members changed 
in these years as well. This was made clear by the third Summit 
(Manila) in 1987, where the foundations of a new strategy were laid 
down. The ASEAN countries got rid of the import substitution log-
ic, turned towards liberalization and began to pursue a collective 
export-oriented and foreign direct investments-depended strategy 
(Völgyi – Lukács, 2014).
In 1987, the member states signed an agreement on the mutu-
al protection and promotion of investments. This agreement was 
modified in 1997, when the number of ASEAN members was nine 
already. A major step along this way was the establishment of ASE-
AN Investment Area (AIA) by a Framework Agreement in October 
1998. The aim of AIA was to enhance the attractiveness of the re-
gion for foreign investors from third countries and also to encourage 
mutual investments in the member states through, among others, 
the reduction or elimination of regulations, while liberalizing the 
12
flow (repatriation) of capital in order to – as the joint press release 
said – make ‘ASEAN an attractive, competitive, open and liberal in-
vestment area’ (cited by Thanadsillapakul, [s.a.])
trade liberalization
The encouragement of capital investments would not have been 
successful without trade liberalization. The realization that a deeper 
economic integration would be needed was first officially articulated 
by the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Co-
operation on the Fourth Summit in Singapore in 1992. This paved 
the road to the earliest key liberalization agreements. Among the 
latter the first was the ‘Agreement on the Common Effective Prefer-
ential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area’ (AFTA 
– from 2010 on ‘ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement’ or ATIGA) that 
was signed on the same summit. After that, trade liberalization has 
begun with a gradual reduction of tariffs on manufactured products 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 2015).
The following years are also known as the period of liberaliza-
tion all over the world. In April 1994, the World Trade Organiza-
tion was established and in 1995,it began its activity. In November 
1994, in the so-called Bogor Declaration, the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC)5 agreed to liberalize the f low of goods and 
capital among each other by 2020. In May 1995, at the ASEAN-EU 
Senior Official’s Meeting, the Prime Minister of Singapore proposed 
to strengthen relations between the two regions (Europe and Asia) 
by organizing a summit. This was welcomed by the EU having a 
‘New Asia Strategy’ since 1994. As a result, the Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM) was launched in 1996 (Bangkok)6. Since then summits with 
5  APEC was founded in 1989 (Canberra, Australia) as a consultation forum between 10 
Asian countries, among them the then six members of ASEAN, the USA and Canada. By 
now, APEC has 21 member states.
6  The initial ASEM partnership in 1996 consisted of 15 EU member states and 7 ASEAN 
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the participation of leaders of member states and representatives of 
the two integrations and other European and Asian countries have 
been held in every two years and ministers with different portfolios 
(economy, finance, culture) have met regularly too. After the strong 
USA-EU connections and the cooperation between Asia-North 
America in the form of the APEC, the ASEM has become the “miss-
ing link” in the connections of the Triad (North America, Western 
Europe and Asia). In the frame of these forms of cooperation, the 
liberalization of trade and investments continued in the 1990s, and 
the ASEAN members have speeded up the liberalization of their in-
tra-regional trade as well. 
The next important step on the way towards a more integrated 
inner market was the creation of the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation 
(AICO) scheme in 1996 that replaced the AIJV and the Brand-to-
Brand Complementation (BBC) Schemes. AICO retained some of 
the features of AIJVs and BBC but offered more in terms of tariff 
and non-tariff incentives. AICO aimed to encourage cross border 
intra-regional investments and trade between ASEAN-based com-
panies in the technology-intensive industries, offering import duties 
reduction to the participants. The overwhelming majority of the 
projects that fulfilled the requirements (40% ASEAN-content, a 
minimum of two participating companies in two different ASEAN 
countries7) and thus could enjoy the benefits of the scheme be-
longed to the automobile industry. Although the Japanese compa-
nies could benefit a lot from the reduced import duties, the AICO 
scheme could be considered quite successful from the viewpoint of 
ASEAN member states as well, inasmuch as it helped to increase 
member states plus China, Japan, Korea and the European Commission. Due to the 
enlargement of both integrations and the involvement of other states from Europe 
and Asia, the number of dialogue partners is already 53 today. (About the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM). http://www.aseminfoboard.org/about)
7  ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme. ASEAN website. http://asean.org/?static_
post=asean-industrial-cooperation-scheme.
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the level of regional integration of automobile production. As, how-
ever, tariff reductions in the framework of AFTA was no longer 
available from 2010 onwards (with the exception of the four more 
recent members, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, which 
joined the ASEAN after that AFTA had been launched and hence 
were allowed to reduce their tariffs over a longer period), AICO 
ceased to offer extra advantages to most of the member states and 
was terminated and superseded by ASEAN Trade in Goods Agree-
ment (ATIGA) (Sim, 2011).
Endeavours for financial cooperation
The trade liberalization and the different production cooperation 
schemes have been sufficient only to maintain the level of intra-re-
gional economic ties but could not deepen economic integration 
significantly. However, the financial turmoil in 1997 and 1998 had 
a serious knock-on effect on the biggest nations of ASEAN (Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines) and also on South Korea.8 
The positive yield of this crisis for ASEAN was the recognition of 
the need for regional financial cooperation at state level in order 
to prevent and/or successfully manage similar crises in the future. 
Japan provided loan to the troubled countries and proposed to for-
mulate an Asian Monetary Fund in order the replace the role of the 
IMF in the region. The idea of self-reliance in financial matters was 
not completely new to the founding members of ASEAN which had 
agreed to establish reciprocal currency or swap arrangements as 
early as in 1977. However, the volume of these deals (200 million 
USD from 1978 on) was far from being sufficient during the East 
Asian financial crisis. 
This assumption has led to the expansion of regional coopera-
8  The evolution of the financial cooperation in Southeast Asia after the 1997-98 financial 
crisis was described in more detail bySeung-Cheol (2004).
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tion in East Asia. The crisis-hit ASEAN invited the leaders of China, 
Japan and South Korea to their summit in November 1997, then 
again in 1998, in Hanoi, where China proposed that central banks 
of the “ASEAN+3” should meet on a regular basis. Next year in 
Manila the leaders of ASEAN+3 issued a formal statement on their 
wish to cooperate in several fields, including financial matters. This 
process led to the formulation of a financial cooperation in Chiang 
Mai, Thailand, in 2000. In the so-called Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) 
the partners agreed to establish a regional monitoring framework, 
facilitate regional surveillance, create swap networks and conduct 
common research and training personnel.9 Since then the financial 
cooperation has been strengthening thanks first of all to China’s ef-
forts towards community building in East Asia (Lee 2010, Sussang-
karn 2010). 
In 2009 the CMI was ‘multilateralized’ (CMIM) with the cre-
ation of a fund of 120 billion USD (20 percent of this amount was 
contributed by ASEAN, 16 percent by South Korea and 32 percent 
by China together with Hong Kong and 32 percent by Japan). The 
amount was doubled in 2012 and a CMIM Stability Found was 
introduced (more precisely, it was separated within the 240 bil-
lion USD fund) to provide short-term liquidity support in case of 
temporary liquidity problems. Other modifications have also been 
made. Nonetheless, CMIM remained highly inefficient for manag-
ing the financial problems of the region. The money in CMIM only 
amounts to 1.5 percent of the GDP of ASEAN+3 (the European fi-
nancial safety net that served similar goals was much larger both in 
absolute and relative terms, being equal with 750 billion euro or 8 
percent of the then Eurozone GDP). For this reason, CMIM can be 
neither a supplement nor even a partner of the IMF in the region as 
yet (West, 2014).
9  The Joint Ministerial Statement of the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting (6 May 
2000, Chiang Mai).
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single market – an unfeasible dream?
The formulation of a single market has been on the agenda 
of ASEAN since the 1997-1998 financial crisis. According to the 
original plan (“Vision 2020” – Kuala Lumpur 1997) the economic 
community should have been achieved by 2020 (The establishment 
of the ASEAN Investment Area in 1998, mentioned earlier, was also 
part of this plan). On the ninth summit (2003, Bali, Indonesia) with 
the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, also known as Bali Concord 
II, the ASEAN made a ‘historic step toward regional integration’. 
This document, which was inspired by Indonesia (see later), de-
clared that the member states would establish the ASEAN Com-
munity by 2020 and specified the three pillars of this community: 
Political-security, Economic and Socio-cultural.
During the 12th summit (Cebu, Philippines, 2007) the member states 
agreed to accelerate the procedure of economic integration and 
decided that it should be realised until 2015. On the 13th summit 
(Singapore, November 2007) the leaders signed the ‘constitution’ of 
ASEAN, the ASEAN Charter, that was ratified by the member states in 
a year and could enter into force on 15 December 2008. The Charter 
declared that the purpose of ASEAN is to establish a single, eco-
nomically integrated market, the free flow of goods, services and 
investment by 2015. It created, among others, the position of a sec-
retary-general and permanent representatives of ASEAN and in-
creased the number of summits from one to two per year.10 The Charter 
is a legally binding agreement that provides legal status and institu-
tional framework for ASEAN and codified the values and rules for it. 
On the basis of the Charter, ASEAN gained its new institutional 
structure that manages the three pillars (political and security, eco-
nomic and socio-cultural community), the development of which 
10  The ASEAN Charter. http://www.asean.org/storage/images/ASEAN_RTK_2014/ASEAN_
Charter.pdf.
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should lead to a more integrated community. The ASEAN Commu-
nity Councils comprise the Council of the three pillars of ASEAN. 
The relevant ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies are under the su-
pervision of the Community Councils. 
The ASEAN Secretariat is the main administrative body of ASEAN. 
At the top of it is the Secretary-General, as the Chief Administrative 
Officer, who is appointed by the ASEAN Summit for five years, se-
lected from among nationals of the ASEAN Member States based on 
alphabetical rotation. Between 2013 and 2017, the Secretary-General 
of ASEAN is Le Luong Minh from Vietnam. 
Under the ASEAN Secretary-General there are four departments 
serving for 1) the Political and Security Community (APSC), 2) the 
Economic Community (AEC), 3) the Socio-Cultural Community 
(ASCC) (the three pillars) and 4) for the Community and Corporate 
Affairs (CCA). APSC is divided into two directorates (Political and 
Security Directorate and External Relations Directorate), while the 
other Departments work with three directorates each. Under the 
AEC Department an ASEAN Integration Monitoring Directorate, a 
Market Integration Directorate and a Sectoral Development Direc-
torate operate. ASSC has an Analysis and Monitoring, a Human De-
velopment and a Sustainable Development Directorate. A Corporate 
Affairs, a Legal Service and Agreements and a Community Affairs 
Directorate belong to the CCA. Every Directorate is subdivided into 
two to seven Divisions.11 The ASEAN has got the institutional struc-
ture that is suitable for managing a single market.
The global crisis of 2008 influenced the economic performance 
of the member states through the weakening demand on the world 
market, but otherwise they could weather the worst crisis years 
basically well. At the end of December 2015 the completion of 
ASEAN Community was declared as by then the goals described in 
11  For more details see ASEAN Secretariat Organizational Structure. http://asean.org/
asean/asean-structure/organisational-structure-2/.
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the ASEAN Charter have been achieved. For example, the free trade 
area has been virtually established, the import duties in ASEAN 
have already been practically eliminated by 2010 (Remo, 2015), and 
the remaining tariffs have been reduced to less than five percent 
leading to a4.5 percent average tariff rate by 2015. 
However, tax reduction is equal neither to free trade nor with 
economic integration. The weight of intra-regional trade has not in-
creased much (it is still about one quarter of the total) and the num-
ber of non-tariff-measures swelled from 1,634 in 2000 to 5,975 in 
2015 (Ing et al. 2016, p. 21.). So there is a lot to do until the markets of 
the ten members become really integrated. The tasks are described 
in the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025.12
Despite the achievements described above, ASEAN has remained 
an intergovernmental organization with much weaker intra-region-
al economic relations than that of the European Union. The reasons 
for this are to be found in the big differences between the size, com-
petitiveness, culture and governance systems of member states and 
the diverging interests deriving from these. The well-structured but 
loose, politically non-binding character of ASEAN institutions is 
also a consequence of and at the same time a reason for this situa-
tion, in which Indonesia has always been the decisive factor.
InDonEsIA WItHIn tHE AsEAn
Relative importance of Indonesia within AsEAn
By its GDP per capita, today Indonesia is a middle income13, 
middle developed country both in international and ASEAN com-
12  ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025. http://www.asean.org/storage/
images/2015/November/aec-page/AEC-Blueprint-2025-FINAL.pdf.
13  According to the classification of the World Bank, Indonesia belongs to the group of 
‘lower middle income’ countries.
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parisons. In 2015 its GDP per capita was 11,100 PP$ (purchasing 
parity standard), No 132 out of 229 countries of the world and 
the fifth largest among the ten ASEAN countries (Table 1).14 In the 
Global Competitiveness Index 2015-2016of the World Economic Fo-
rum Indonesia was ranked 37th out of 140 economies, fourth within 
ASEAN after Singapore (which wasNo.2 in the Global Competitive-
ness ranking), Malaysia (No. 18) and Thailand (No.32) (WEF 2015, p. 
xv.). Indonesia is also less ‘globalized’ than most of its ASEAN part-
ners. In 2015 the country exported less than not only Singapore, 
but Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam as well and gave 13 percent of 
the total exports of ASEAN in 2015.15
Having the largest domestic market within ASEAN, Indonesia 
has always been less reliant on foreign markets than other member 
states of the organization. The openness of Indonesian economy 
is among the lowest in ASEAN: the ratio of exports of goods and 
services to GDP was 23.9 percent in 201316 higher only than that of 
Myanmar out of the ten members. Besides, the share of FDI stock to 
GDP (29.8 percent in 201417) is the third lowest after Myanmar and 
the Philippines – again within the ASEAN. 
In spite of this relative middle-position of the advancement 
of Indonesian economy within the ASEAN, Indonesia occupies a 
central place in the community, being the biggest nation out of the 
ten members regarding its territory, population and GDP as well 
(see Figure 1 and 2). Besides, Indonesia has the largest Sunni Mus-
lim population in the world (87.2 percent of the inhabitants are 
Muslim). Furthermore, in the pastyears, Indonesia has become the 
14  CIA The World Factbook, Country comparison: GDP per capita (PPP). https://www.cia.
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html#id.
15  Author’s own calculations based on ASEAN External Trade Statistics. Table 17. http://
asean.org/?static_post=external-trade-statistics-3
16  UNCTADStat, Data Center, Trade indicators, Goods and services (BPM6): Trade openness 
indicators, annual, 2005-2014.
17  UNCTADStat Data Center, Foreign direct investments.
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second most attractive location of transnational corporations within 
ASEAN after Singapore. Recently in absolute terms more foreign 
direct investments flowed to or were reinvested in the country than 
in other member states, except for Singapore, and the share of Indo-
nesia in the total FDI stock of ASEAN reached 15 percent in 2014.18 
The increase of FDI-inflow is likely to continue under the new 
President, Joko Widodo (elected in 2014) as he has launched dereg-
ulation and shortened the ‘negative investment list’ that contains 
the names of sectors to which foreign investment restrictions apply 
(Tang, 2016.)
Because of this duality – the largest but only less globalized and 
less competitive economy of ASEAN – Indonesia has always played 
an ambiguous role in the evolution of East Asian cooperation. To 
understand this ambiguity one must cast a glance to the history of 
the country.
short historical overview
Like many other colonial territories, Indonesia achieved its 
independence by years of struggles and became independent in 
1949. Its first president was Sukarno, who in 1957, after years of 
parliamentary democracy, introduced a new political system called 
‘guided democracy’. He intended to reconcile the three main ideol-
ogies of Indonesia and the social forces behind them: nationalism 
(the army), religion (the Islamic groups) and communism (the Com-
munist Party of Indonesia). The latter enjoyed increasing popularity 
in that time both worldwide and in Indonesia as well. As a conse-
quence, Sukarno’s regime had a strong anti-imperialistic, nationalis-
tic and increasingly socialistic character – similarly to North Korea, 
for example. Sukarno made meaningful steps to alleviate poverty 
and increase the standard of living of country’s population (devel-
18  UNCTADStat Data Center, Foreign direct investments.
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opment of the educational and health systems, labour protection 
rules etc.), but in financing these measures the country has become 
increasingly dependent on foreign (American and Soviet) financial aid. 
In the middle of the 1960s, Indonesia faced a severe economic 
crisis – not independently from the fact that because of Sukarno’s 
increasingly communist-friendly political line the US withdrew its 
financial assistance from the country (Mehr 2009, p. 70). Although 
there is not clear evidence, certain historians still believe that the 
United States (the CIA) was involved in the elimination of the Su-
karno regime (Scott 2015, Simpson 2015). Sukarno’s ‘old order’ was 
swept away by its Muslim and military oppositions and General 
Suharto’s strong assistance through a massacre between October 
1965 and March 1966, when 500,000 – or, according to some es-
timations, even three million – communists, alleged communists 
and Chinese were killed.19 This event was welcomed by the Unit-
ed States (Mehr 2009, Simpson 2015). The person who followed 
Sukarno in the presidency directed the historical development of 
Indonesia towards a capital market economy.20 To ensure this ‘new 
order”, Suharto, first as military leader (between 1965 and 1967, 
in the period when also the large-scale killings occurred), then as 
the President (1967-1998) of Indonesia was the engine of politi-
cal block-building that aimed at peace and security (i.e. curbing 
communist influence) in the region. The foundation of the ASEAN 
would not have been possible without Indonesia, the largest na-
tion of the region in terms of population, territory and economy 
as well. Under the Suharto era (1965-1998) ASEAN was important 
in the Indonesian foreign policy, and the country was proactive in 
the ASEAN at least concerning political (security) cooperation, and 
promoted its own image as the leader nation within the community 
19  Al Jazeera (2012), Cribb (2004, p. 133).
20  NSA EBB (s.a.).
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or the ‘primus inter pares’ among the members (Heiduk 2016a). Fol-
lowing Suharto’s regime, the importance of ASEAN in the Indone-
sian foreign policy has fluctuated. It increased in the first few years 
after Suharto, then, during and after Megawati’s presidency (2001-
2004) increased, while since 2014 it has seemed to lower again. This 
we will discuss in Section 3.4 and 3.5 in more detail. Before that, we 
devote a section to the question of economic integration, that has 
never been so important for Indonesia as the political cooperation.
Indonesian approach of economic integration
The Indonesian political leaders, but also the academics of the 
country have always feared the export competition from other ASEAN 
-countries like Singapore. Besides, they have held the opinion that 
smaller countries like Brunei or Singapore would benefit from it 
more than the larger ones as small countries would gain access to 
the markets of large countries. 
For this reason, Indonesia was reluctant to accept the conditions 
of AFTA in 1992 and agreed only after gaining a fifteen-year delay 
in the implementation of liberalization. In spite of this, however, 
the country has implemented all its commitments in due time, by 1 
January 2002. Indonesia also had reservations in connection with 
the bilateral free trade agreements (AFTA plus) that the ASEAN 
has signed with third countries in the region (China, Japan, South 
Korea, India and New Zealand) from 2002 onwards. Similarly, 
Indonesia has been reluctant to liberalize its aviation and taken a 
conservative position in connection with the liberalization of labour 
mobility and in other issues as well (see Heiduk 2016a for further 
details). There is also a hesitation in Indonesia about joining the 
US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would mean further 
liberalization and according to some estimations would worsen the 
Indonesian balance of trade (Sahu, 2016). 
The fears have been well founded. The course of liberalization in 
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the 1990s has hit hard the labour-intensive industries of Indonesia, 
which lost their competitiveness on their export markets that resulted 
in unemployment and increasing poverty (Chowdhury, 2007). The 
‘open’ unemployment rate increased from below 3 percent in 1992-
1993 to over 11 percent or close to 12 million in August 2005 and 
began to decrease only after that year, when the world economy was 
dynamic due to the financial bubbles of the core countries (United 
States and the European Union) and the growth of China. The un-
employment rate continued to fall even during the global crisis of 
2008 and in February 2016 it was 5.5 percent.21
If, however, we take into consideration the underemployment 
(or ‘hidden’ unemployment) as well, the labour market situation is 
much more problematic. The Indonesian underemployment is hard 
to precisely assess. There are numbers between 30 to 47 percent. 
In the period of 1994-1997, 23 percent of labour force worked less 
than 25 hours and 38 percent worked less than 35 hours a week, 
and only a tenth of these underemployed were looking for a job 
(Dhanani, 2004, p. 23 and 30). The underemployment has been 
typical of the traditionally extended informal sector. Although there 
have been some improvements in this field in the last years, still 
an estimated 53.6 percent of the employed worked in the informal 
economy in February 2014 (ILO 2014, p.2). 
Not independently from the above-mentioned facts, poverty 
is still high in Indonesia. Between 1970 and 1996, the number of 
people living in poverty fell considerably, from 70 million to 22.5 
million. The following years, however, brought the East Asian fi-
nancial crisis – the product of global speculative capital – and the 
Indonesian economy collapsed. In 1998 the GDP contracted by 13 
percent22, unemployment increased and inflation soared. The latter 
21  BadanPusatStatistik (BPS-Statistics Indonesia), Unemployment Rate (UR) by Province, 
1986 - 2016https://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/981
22  UNCTADstat, Date center, Economictrends, National accounts.
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development hit the poor especially hard and their number rose 
sharply, reaching 49.5 million in 1998. After that year poverty has 
been somewhat alleviated, but the number of people living under 
the poverty line (about 30 USD per person per month in 2013) was 
still 28 million in March 201623 – higher than almost two decades 
earlier. Besides, in 2013, 43 percent of the country’s population lived 
on less than 2 USD a day (Mietzner, 2014, p. 113), the Gini coefficient 
(measuring inequality) reached a record high 41 percent in 2011 
and has remained constant since then.24 The social dissatisfaction 
triggered by these developments made people receptive to the 
‘pragmatic, moderate, and inclusive populism’ (Mietzner, 2014, p. 115) 
that Joko Widodo represented in the next presidential elections in 
2014. 
To escape poverty, many Indonesians have been seeking work 
in the Middle East (first of all Saudi Arabia) and in the surrounding 
countries (first of all Malaysia). The government has helped hun-
dreds of thousands of labour migrants to go abroad every year since 
the 1990s. In 2006, 2.7 million Indonesian citizens or 2.8 percent of 
the countries’ workforce worked legally abroad (IOM, 2010). There 
is an unknown but likely significant number of illegal workers as 
well especially in Malaysia (The estimated number of all migrant 
workers in the whole ASEAN-region is 14 million. IBON 2015). 
To strengthen the economy and prevent the exploitation of 
(mostly illegal) migrant workers in the host countries of the region, 
Indonesia has been interested more in building a political community 
(for example protecting ‘human rights’) than in free trade with its 
ASEAN partners. This is one reason why Indonesia has not become 
an engine of the economic integration.
23  BadanPusatStatistik (BPS-Statistics Indonesia), Number of Poor People by Province, 
2013-2016, https://www.bps.go.id/linkTableDinamis/view/id/1119
24  BadanPusatStatistik (BPS-Statistics Indonesia), Gini Ratio byProvince, https://www.bps.
go.id/linkTableDinamis/view/id/1116
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Under Suharto (1965-1998) the primary goal of the Indonesian 
foreign policy was to reach regional stability and cooperation with-
out too much economic liberalization because of the above-men-
tioned lack of sufficient competitiveness in relation to some ASEAN 
partners and asymmetric gains from liberalization. Heiduk (2016a) 
adds three other factors that explain why ASEAN has not evolved 
to a strong economic union. First the lack of economic interdepen-
dence between Indonesia and its ASEAN-partners; second, Jakarta’s 
orientation towards ex-regional partners in economic cooperation 
and third, the diverging interests of ASEAN-countries regarding 
key aspects of regional integration. The latter means that, while 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand would like to see deeper economic 
integration, Indonesia prioritises political goals, first of all, security 
(Heiduk, 2016a, p.8). The weight of Indonesia within ASEAN, its 
reluctance towards deeper regional market integration, together 
with the ASEAN way of consensus decision making, have all resulted 
in that ASEAN has failed to create supranational institutions and 
preserved its strictly intergovernmental character (Heiduk, 2016a, 
p.7). We must add, however, that Indonesia has not been the only 
country that has curbed the deepening of the economic cooperation. 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand have also been more integrated into 
the world economy than into the ASEAN. Besides, Singapore has 
been the only member of ASEAN that has been competitive enough 
to gain from trade liberalization, while other members of region 
have been rightfully reluctant to open their markets to foreign pro-
ducers.
Interests in security political cooperation
After the terrorist attack against the World Trade Centre in the 
United States in September 2001, the issue of security was brought 
into focus worldwide. Indonesia was especially affected by the 
problem as the country was hit by a number of terrorist attacks (for 
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various reasons) in the first years of the 2000s. The most serious 
was the attack in October in Bali, when 202 people, mostly foreign 
tourists, were killed by Islamic extremists. For this reason, it is not 
surprising that it was Indonesia that proposed the establishment of 
an ASEAN Security Community in 2003. We have to remember that 
until that year, the economic liberalization and cooperation have 
made some progress and in the given circumstances it became clear 
that without security cooperation the economic integration cannot 
be continued. Consequently, other member states, less affected by 
terrorism and being more interested in economic than political as-
pects, were also open to the establishment of closer ties within the 
framework of ASEAN. Especially because the Indonesian proposal 
aimed at a broader than military cooperation of member states 
in order to save peace and be able to avoid intervention by extra 
regional forces (like in Iraq) in case of political destabilization in 
the region. This proposal and the discussions over that led to the 
infamous Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord) in October 
2003, which declared the formation of the ASEAN Community 
with its three pillars (security, economic, socio-cultural). 
By initiating the security community, which has become the 
first pillar of ASEAN Community, Indonesia acted as an engine for 
further development of ASEAN. Besides, Indonesia makes efforts 
to reform the traditional (consensual) decision making process of 
ASEAN, to make sanctions possible in cases of non-compliance of 
agreements, and also, to increase financial contributions of member 
states to the ASEAN Secretariat. However, these initiatives failed 
because of the resistance of other member states. As far as the eco-
nomic integration is concerned, in the history of ASEAN Indonesia 
has not initiated any measures or policies, what is more, the coun-
try has tended to block or delay measures that aimed at deepening 
economic cooperation (Heiduk, 2016a, pp. 8-9). These efforts and 
the lack of efforts represent that within the frames of its own in-
terests and only within those, Indonesia would welcome stronger 
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institutions in ASEAN.
After a more than three-decade long stable political rule and 
high economic growth, the Southeast Asian financial crisis swept 
away President Suharto’s regime in 1998. The successors (first 
Habibie, then Wahid, both for short periods, and Megawati between 
2001 and 2004) ruled amidst a very difficult economic and political 
situation (e.g. riots in Aceh province, departure of East-Timor, ter-
rorism). In 2004, SusiloBambangYudhoyono (also known as SBY) 
came to power and served for two terms. In spite of the natural 
disasters that affected the country under his presidency (tsunamis 
in 2004 and 2010, earthquakes in 2009 and an eruption of Mount 
Merapiin 2010) the economy performed relatively well: the annual 
growth rate of GDP per capita was three to five percent and poverty 
alleviated too. Thanks to its large domestic market and low depen-
dence on export, Indonesia was among the few ASEAN members 
that did not suffer from recession due to the global crisis in 2008. 
During Suharto, the military effectively controlled the ministry 
of foreign affairs and the generals’ influence on foreign policy has 
been maintained for several years after Suharto as well. SBY, how-
ever, although he has been a senior military officer, he has success-
fully delinked the military and the ministry of foreign affairs and 
professionalized foreign policy. Until the end of SBY’s second term, 
the attitude of Indonesia towards ASEAN has somewhat changed. 
There has been a shift in foreign policy orientation with third 
countries gaining more attention. This has been reflected in the 
redefinition of foreign policy as “all direction foreign policy” and 
the identification of Indonesia as a country that has ‘thousands (in 
SBY’s second term: millions) of friends and zero enemies’ (Connelly, 
2014 p. 2, Yudhoyono, [s.a.]). This, however, did not mean a turning 
away from ASEAN. Instead, SBY sought to maintain warmer rela-
tions with its neighbours and in the same time improve relations 
with China, the United States and other powers in and outside the 
region as well. 
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turning away from AsEAn?
In 2014, SBY was succeeded by Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”) and 
speculations have emerged that the Indonesian foreign policy and 
the place of ASEAN in it would change. These speculations were 
based on the fact that Jokowi represents a basically new type of po-
litical carrier in Indonesia– he has been compared by the media to 
Barack Obama –, which is likely to determine how he looks at the 
world. All the previous presidents of Indonesia have been military 
persons or (as in Megawati Sukarnoputri’s case) had strong relations 
with the army. Jokowi, however, has neither military nor political 
elite background. He is of humble origins who used to live with his 
family in illegally built shacks in much of his childhood. He began 
to work at twelve years of age in his father’s small business. In 1985, 
he obtained a degree in forestry engineering at GadjahMada Uni-
versity in Yogyakarta. Then he worked for a state owned pulp mill 
company in Aceh province before establishing his own furniture 
factory. He has been exporting furniture for 24 years, travelling a 
lot to Europe, the United States and Australia. Although Jokowi has 
got knowledge about the world beyond Indonesia, he has not become 
a member of the cosmopolitan business elite that is equipped with 
good political relations. He served as a Mayor of Surakarta (his home-
town in Java with 500 thousand inhabitants) from 2005 until 2012, 
then as a Governor of Jakarta between 2012 and 2014.Jokowi’s 
strength is domestic policy. He plans to stimulate economic growth 
by upgrading the infrastructure (which he performed successfully 
in Surakarta) and attracting foreign investors to the country. On 
domestic political field, he identified curbing corruption as one of 
its top priorities. As to social policy, he wants to improve public ser-
vices and help the poor with other measures as well (Connelly 2014 
pp. 4-5, Hollar [s.a.]). 
Jokowi’s foreign policy guidelinescan be summarized as follows 
(Connelly, 2014, Pandu, 2015, Shekhar – Liow, 2014): Indonesia is 
ROLE OF INDONESIA IN THE EVOLUTION OF ASEAN  29
primarily an archipelagic state that can enhance its global role by 
pursuing a middle power diplomacy and expanding its influence in 
the Indo-Pacific region(‘We want Indonesia to become the world’s 
maritime axis’ – Jokowi said already as a presidential candidate in 
June 2014, Ramadhani – Marbun 2014); the economic diplomacy has 
to gain stronger positions and for this reason the foreign ministry is 
to be reformed. In the first month of Jokowi’s presidency, analysis 
stated that as Jokowi lacked foreign political and strategic skills and 
diplomatic experience, as opposed to SBY, he would not be able to 
pursue such a ‘streamlined’ and outward-looking internationalist 
foreign policy and he would neither be able to preserve the inde-
pendence of foreign ministry from the influence of the army. Con-
sequently, the observers predicted that Jakarta would turn away 
from ASEAN and take a more nationalistic path in its foreign policy 
(see Connelly 2014, Prashanth 2015a and Qin 2015). The assump-
tions were so sound that Jokowi and its cabinet had to refute it re-
peatedly (Prashanth, 2015b).
The fears might be exaggerated but not completely unfounded. 
Jokowi intends to increase defence spending up to 1.5 percent of 
GDP (Parlina 2016) and stop illegal fishing by sinking foreign ves-
sels that enter territorial waters of the country. He reintroduced the 
death penalty for drug smugglers that caused diplomatic problems 
as well after Brazilian and Dutch citizens were executed in early 
2015 (Today, 2015). Furthermore, one of Jokowi’s foreign policy ad-
visers, Rizal Sukma, has declared that ASEAN is no more ‘the’ cor-
nerstone of the Indonesian foreign policy, it is only ‘a’ cornerstone of 
that (Prashanth, 2014). The Jokowi administration, although aiming 
at encouraging foreign investments, also increased tariffs for a set 
of consumer goods and introduced new tariff and non-tariff trade 
barriers in order to protect local producers (Heiduk, 2016b). 
Furthermore, it seems that the anti-imperialists rhetoric returns 
with Jokowi to some extent – albeit in a 21st century form. Jokowi 
is a member of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle which 
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is led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of the first President 
of Indonesia, Sukarno. Six months after his inauguration, at the 
Asian-African Conference (that was initiated by Sukarno is 1955), 
Jokowi openly criticized the United Nations (in connection with its 
Palestinian policy), the International Monetary Fund and the policy 
of global superpowers in general, stating that the idea that global 
problems can be solved by the West is “obsolete” and a new eco-
nomic order is needed, where emerging powers also have a say “to 
avoid the domination of certain groups of countries” (Today, 2015).
All these do not mean that ASEAN would have ceased to be 
the base of the regional stability and security for Indonesia. The 
Jokowi administration will likely continue similar policy than its 
predecessors in connection with the cooperation in issues like mi-
gration, terrorism, the Islamic State and also disaster management. 
In the latter cases Indonesia is interested in and forcing even closer 
cooperation in ASEAN. The reluctance of the Indonesian leaders 
towards deeper economic cooperation with other ASEAN members, 
as we have discussed it above, is not a new phenomenon. It has 
been characteristic of the Indonesian ASEAN-policy from the very 
beginning. What can be identified as a turning away from ASEAN 
is the passivism in regional affairs. As we saw, Indonesia has always 
been a driving force for the development of regional cooperation by 
pursuing active policy concerning security. It seems, however, that 
this activism has been set aside by Jokowi’s administration (Heiduk, 
2016b), as it has other priorities as well. If so, the development of 
the regional cooperation within ASEAN will likely to stall.
ConCLUsIons
The ASEAN has come a long way since its foundation by a short 
declaration in 1967. By now, it has a Charter that summarizes its so-
ROLE OF INDONESIA IN THE EVOLUTION OF ASEAN  31
cio-economic and political goals and specifies its institutional struc-
ture. However, despite repeated efforts, ASEAN has never been so 
successful in economic integration as the European Union has been 
or even the integration of the Eastern European countries (COME-
COM) was earlier. At first glance, the reason for it is the diverging 
interests of member states of ASEAN because of the differences in 
their competitiveness and the possible asymmetry of gains from lib-
eralization. This is, however, not unique for ASEAN, as there have 
always been countries of different development levels within the 
much more integrated European Union as well. Looking for more 
satisfactory explanation for the difference in the depth of economic 
integration of the two organizations, we can find the different atti-
tudes of leading nations of integrations (Germany in the case of EU 
and Indonesia in the case of ASEAN) on the issue. This difference 
between the respective attitudes of Indonesia and Germany can be 
further explained by the difference of their competitiveness in com-
parison to other members of their organizations. Having a relatively 
weak economy, Indonesia has had to fear regional liberalization, 
while the very developed Germany has not. 
On the other hand, Indonesia has been traditionally interested 
in security cooperation in the region and by actively supporting 
this, the country has been a driving force both of the foundation 
and the development of ASEAN. With President Jokowi, however, 
an old-new style of political leadership emerged in 2014. Growing 
up in poverty, having personal experiences as a worker, business-
man and Mayor of Surakarta and Governor of Jakarta, and accord-
ing to the traditional political stance of his political party, led by 
Sukarno’s daughter, Jokowi occupied a more globalization-critical 
platform than his predecessor. Jokowi has been following a popu-
list-nationalist path that defines Indonesia as a middle power or a 
‘global maritime axis’ that has to be more active in the Indo-Pacific 
region. 
It does not mean that Indonesia under Jokowi will turn against 
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Western powers or turns its back on ASEAN. Instead of this, the 
Jokowi administration has been maintaining the traditionally very 
good relations with the US, from which Indonesia has got billions 
of dollars in the past decades, and continues to look at ASEAN as its 
most important partner for preserving regional peace and security. 
The shift of emphasis in foreign policy towards a broader than ASE-
AN regional political role, however, may result in a durable decrease 
of activity within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations that 
would halt the deepening of cooperation within this organisation.
ROLE OF INDONESIA IN THE EVOLUTION OF ASEAN  33
REFEREnCEs
1967 ASEAN Declaration. Unofficial text. Centre for International 
Law. Available https://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/1967%20ASEAN%20
Declaration-pdf.pdfAccessed22June 2016.
Al Jazeera. 2012. Indonesia’s killing fields. 21 Dec. Available http:// 
www.aljazeera.com/programmes/101east/ 2012/12/20121218 
74846 805636.htmlAccessed 14 July 2016.
ASEAN Secretariat. 2015. A Blueprint for Growth ASEAN Economic 
Community 2015: Progress and Key Achievements. ASEAN Sec-
retariat, Jakarta.
Chowdhury, A. 2007. Indonesia’s Hesitance with AFTA and AFTA 
plus: A Political Economy Explanation. Paper for “FTA, Regional 
integration and Development” Conference, Pusan National Uni-
versity, Busan, South Korea, December 18-19. Available https://
faculty.washington.edu/karyiu/confer/busan07/papers/chowd-
hury.pdfAccessed 28 June 2016.
Connelly, A. L. 2014. Indonesian foreign policy under President Jo-
kowi. Lowy Institute for International Policy. Analysis. Sydney. 
Available http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/indonesian-for-
eign-policy-under-president-jokowi_0.pdfAccessed 26 June 
2016.
Cribb, R. 2004. The Indonesian Genocide of 1965-1966. In: Samuel 
Totten (ed.): Teaching about Genocide: Approaches, and Resources. 
Information Age Publishing, pp. 133-143. 
Dhanani, S. 2004: Unemployment and Underemployment in Indo-
nesia, 1976-2000: Paradoxes and Issues. International Labour 
Office, Geneva, January. Available http://www.oit.org/public/
english/protection/ses/download/docs/indonesia.pdfAccessed 13 
July 2016.
Heiduk, F. 2016a. Indonesia in ASEAN. Regional Leadership be-
tween Ambition and Ambiguity. SWP Research Paper. Stiftung, 
34
Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International 
and Security Affairs, RP 6 April, Berlin. Available https://www.
swp-berlin.org /fileadmin/contents/products/research_pa-
pers/2016RP06_hdk.pdfAccessed29 June 2016.
Heiduk, F. 2016b.Finding Regionalism in Jokowi’s Foreign Policy. 
The Diplomat, May 03.Available http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/
finding-regionalism-in-jokowis-foreign-policy/Accessed 18 July 
2016
Hollar, S. [s.a.] Joko Widodo. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Available 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Joko-WidodoAccessed 
16 July 2016
IBON 2015. ASEAN Community 2015: Integration for Whom? 
IBON International Policy Brief, April. Available http://ibonin-
ternational.org/sites/ibon/files/resources/IBON%20Policy%20
Brief%20on%20ASEAN%20integration.pdfAccessed 2 June 2016.
ILO. 2014. Indonesia: Labour and social trends update. August 2014, 
International Labour Organization, ILO Jakarta Office.
Ing, L. Y. – Cadot, O. – Anandhika, R. – Urata, S. 2016. Non-Tariff 
Measures in ASEAN: A Simple Proposal. In: Ing, L. Y. – Fernandez, S. 
– Cadot, O. (Eds.): Non-Tariff Measures in ASEAN. Economic 
Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia and United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development pp. 13-36., April 2016. 
Available http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ERIA-UNC-
TAD_Non-Tariff_Measures_in_ASEAN_en.pdfAccessed 20th 
June, 2016
IOM. 2010. Labour Migration from Indonesia. An Overview of 
Indonesian Migration to Selected Destinations in Asia and the 
Middle East. International Organization for Migration (IOM), Ja-
karta. 
Keling, M. F.; Som, H. Md.; Saludin, M. N.; Shuib, Md. S.; Ajis, M. N. 2011: 
The Development of ASEAN from Historical Approach. Asian 
Social Science, July, Vol. 7 Issue 7, pp. 169-189.
Lee, Y. J. 2010. Financial Community Building in East Asia The 
ROLE OF INDONESIA IN THE EVOLUTION OF ASEAN  35
Chiang Mai Initiative: Its Causes and Evaluation. EPIK 2010 
Economics of Community Building. Paper presented at 2010 
EPIK Young Leaders Conference, East Asia Institute, Soul, South 
Korea, 17 August. Available http://www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/kor_
report/YoonJinLee.pdfAccessed 27 June 2016
Mehr, N. 2009. ‘Constructive Bloodbath’ in Indonesia: The United States, 
Britain and the Mass Killings of 1965-66. Spokesman Books. Not-
thingam.
Mietzner, M. 2014.Indonesia’s 2014 Elections: How Jokowi Won and 
Democracy Survived. Journal of Democracy, October, Volume 25, 
Number 4, pp. 111-125.
NSA EBB s.a. United States and Suharto: April 1966 – December 
1968. Foreign Relations 1964-1968, Vol. 26. National Security 
Archive, Electronic Briefing Books, The George Washington Uni-
versity. Available http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB52/
doc427.pdfAccessed 14 July 2016.
Pandu, U. M. 2015. Rethinking Indonesia’s global maritime axis. The 
Jakarta Post, March 22.Available http://www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2015/03/22/rethinking-indonesia-s-global-maritime-axis.
htmlAccessed 16 July 2016.
Parlina, I. 2016. Jokowi pledges ambitious arms spending. The Ja-
karta Post, February 24. Available http://www.thejakartapost.
com/news/2016/02/24/jokowi-pledges-ambitious-arms-spend-
ing.htmlAccessed: 20 June 2016.
Prashanth, P. 2014.Is Indonesia Turning Away From ASEAN Under 
Jokowi? The Diplomat, December 18. Available http://thediplo-
mat.com/2014/12/is-indonesia-turning-away-from-asean-un-
der-jokowi/Accessed 8 July 2016.
Prashanth, P. 2015a. The Trouble with Indonesia’s Foreign Policy 
Priorities under Jokowi. The Diplomat, January 09. Available 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/the-trouble-with-indonesias-for-
eign-policy-priorities-under-jokowi/Accessed 14 July 2016.
Prashanth, P. 2015b.Jokowi Defends Indonesia’s Foreign Policy 
36
during US Trip. The Diplomat, October 29. Available http://the-
diplomat.com/2015/10/jokowi-defends-indonesias-foreign-poli-
cy-during-us-trip/Accessed 10 July 2016.
Qin, S. 2015. A Retreat From Multilateralism: Foreign Policy Re-
structuring Under Jokowi. December 23, Australian Institute of 
International Affairs. Available http://www.internationalaffairs.
org.au/australian_outlook/a-retreat-from-multilateralism-for-
eign-policy-restructuring-under-jokowi/Accessed 4 July 2016.
Ramadhani, M. – Marbun, J. 2014. Jokowi supports Palestinian in-
dependence. Republica.co.id, Jakarta, 23 June. Available http://
www.republika.co.id/berita/en/national-politics/14/06/23/
n7m2m7-jokowi-supports-palestinian-independenceAccessed 16 
July 2016.
Remo, A. R. 2015. Tariffs elimination eyed for 85% of goods be-
tween ASEAN, 6 trading partners. May 24th. Inquirer.net.
Available http://globalnation.inquirer.net/123438/tariffs-elimina-
tion-eyed-for-85-of-goods-between-asean-6-trading-partnersAc-
cessed 29 June 2016.
Sahu, P. K. 2016. Insight: Trans-Pacific Partnership: Should Indone-
sia join it or not? The Jakarta Post, February 18. Available http://
www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/02/18/insight-trans-pacific-
partnership-should-indonesia-join-it-or-not.htmlAccessed 16 
July 2016. 
Scott, P. D. 2015. Still Uninvestigated After 50 Years: Did the U.S. 
Help Incite the 1965 Indonesia Massacre? The Asia-Pacific Jour-
nal, Volume 13 Issue 31 Number 1, Aug, pp 1-15.
Seung-Cheol, J. 2004. Asian monetary and financial cooperation in 
response to currency crisis: issues and policy implications. The 
Journal of East Asian Affairs. Fall/Winter, Vol VIII, No 2, pp. 251-
279.
Shekhar, V. – Liow, J. C. 2014. Indonesia as a Maritime Power: Joko-
wi’s Vision, Strategies, and Obstacles Ahead. Brookings.edu. No-
vember 2014. Available http://www.brookings.edu/research/ar-
ROLE OF INDONESIA IN THE EVOLUTION OF ASEAN  37
ticles/2014/11/indonesia-maritime-liow-shekhar#_ftn3Accessed 
16 July 2016.
Shimizu, K. 1999. The Proposal and Implementation of the Brand to 
Brand Complementation Scheme: Intra-ASEAN Economic Co-
operation,1987-1995; An Analysis of Relations between Foreign 
Direct Investment, Multinationals and Intra-Economic Coopera-
tion. Economic Journal of Hokkaido Univ., Vol. 28 pp 95-116. 
Shimizu, K. 2004. The Origin of Intra-ASEAN Economic Coopera-
tion. Economic Journal of Hokkaido Univ., Vol. 33 pp 113-133.
Sim, E. 2011. Celebrating the Life and Death of AICO. June 6. 
ASEAN Economic Community Blog. Available http://aseanec.
blogspot.hu/2011/06/celebrating-life-and-death-of-aico.htmlAc-
cessed: 22 June 2016. 
Simpson, B. 2015.The United States and the 1965–1966 Mass Mur-
ders in Indonesia. Monthly Review, Vol. 67, No 7, December.
Soesastro, H. 2002. The ASEAN Free Trade Area: A critical assess-
ment. The Journal of East Asian Affairs. Spring/Summer, Vol 16, 
No 1, pp. 20-53.
Sussangkarn, C. 2010. The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation: 
Origin, Development and Outlook. Presented at a conference on 
“Regionalism and Reform of the Global Monetary & Financial 
System: What Role for Europe and Asia?”, February 4, Brus-
sels, Belgium. Available http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
events/2010/20100204/2_1_sussangkarn_sl_en.pdfAccessed 27 
June 2016.
Tang, S. K. 2016. Indonesia to open up more sectors to foreign invest-
ment: President Widodo. Channel News Asia, 10 Feb. Available 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/indonesia-to-
open-up-more/2503128.htmlAccessed 18 July 2016
Thanadsillapakul, L. [s.a.] (without year). Framework Agreement on 
the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA). Thailand Law Forum. Avail-
able http://www.thailawforum.com/articles/lawanaia.htmlAc-
cessed 22 June 2016. 
APT(ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREAT)S AND INFLUENCE:  3938
Today, 2015. Jokowi shifts Indonesia away from ‘zero enemies’ di-
plomacy. April 25. Available at http://www.todayonline.com/
world/asia/jokowi-shifts-Indonesia-away-zero-enemies-diploma-
cy?singlepage=trueAccessed 16 July 2016
Völgyi, K. – Lukács, E. 2014. Integration success of Southeast Asia – 
the ASEAN single production base. Space and Society Vol. 28, No. 
4, pp. 97-116.
WEF 2015: The Global Competitiveness Report 2015–2016. World 
Economic Forum, Switzerland.
West, J. 2014. Chiang Mai Initiative: an Asian IMF? Asian Century 
Institute. Available http://asiancenturyinstitute.com/economy/ 
248-chiang-mai-initiative-an-asian-imfAccessed 27 June 2016.
Williamson, J. 1990. What Washington Means by Policy Reform. Peter-
son Institute for International Economics. Chapter 2 from Latin 
American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? Edited by 
John Williamson. Published April 1990. November 2002. Avail-
able http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?Resear-
chID=486Accessed 20 June 2016.
Yudhoyono, E. B. [s.a.]. The Misunderstood Legacy of ‘Zero Enemies, 
Thousands of Friends’. Jakarta Globe. Available http://jakarta-
globe.beritasatu.com/opinion/misunderstood-legacy-zero-ene-
mies-thousands-friends/Accessed 16 July 2016.
